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twofold problem faces Canadian education. The first fold involves the
indoctrination debate, still unsettled after several decades, yet still
bearing decisively on educational policy. The second fold involves the
changing Canadian educational landscape, now obviously characterized by
increasing cultural, religious, and linguistic plurality. This plurality manifests
itself in tribalism and in regular conflicts about normativity in the public square.
In the midst of this plurality, many Canadian parents of school-aged children
believe that courts, provincial governments, and educational authorities deny
them educational justice by determining that their own religion cannot inform
what their children learn in schools. Yet, from their vantage point, their own
educational tax dollars are used to indoctrinate their children into another
worldview-some combination of materialism, secular humanism, and liberalism-every day of the school year. When these parents cry foul, defenders of
common schools reply that the only way to make schools accessible to everyone
is to make them neutral, which implies leaving religion out of education.
Examining the various charges and replies in this discussion reveals a
philosophical-ideological thicket, through which the various parties apparently
can no longer hear each other. I suggest that educators and educational theorists
could go a long way toward solving these policy difficulties if we can find the
will to move forward on the matters of indoctrination, pluralism, and related
concepts, such as neutrality. 1

A

INDOCTRINATION: AN UNSETTLED DEBATE
Conceptual problems and disagreements still dog the debate about
indoctrination in education, even after decades of struggle. Educators,
philosophers of education, the courts, and the public, dispute what differentiates
indoctrination from education, and what criterion or combination of criteria
actually singles out what counts as indoctrination. What does count as
indoctrination? The criteria usually listed include:

52
•

•

•

•

Towards an Ethics of Community
the intention of the teaching activity is to bring about in the student
unshakable or unquestioning belief in an idea, regardless of the veracity of
that idea. 2
the means of teaching violate in one or more ways the rights, agency, or
person of the student. In the language of the philosophy of education, the
means violate a differentiated or positive concept of education, in which
worthwhile learning is implied versus education in the descriptive or
undifferentiated (education system) sense of the word. 3 On this account,
education implies approval of the means of teaching by whomever is
speaking at the moment.
the contents are doctrinaire or contain doctrinaire elements. Some claim
simply that if the contents are about doctrines then we have a case of
indoctrination. 4 In Holocaust revisionism, we uncover a paradigm case of
doctrinaire contents. Some observers, of course, suggest that instruction
in Christian faith serves equally well as a paradigm.
the upshot or outcomes of teaching involves the student's emerging with
either false, unquestioning, or unshakeable beliefs, despite a teacher's good
intentions, laudable methods, and worthwhile content. 5

Each of the above has found defenders who have argued that one of these
criteria is sufficient by itself to identify indoctrination; others have argued for
various combinations of the four. Debates continue regarding each of the
separate criteria as well, resulting in questions like: what is a worthwhile
intention, what are acceptable means, what are doctrinaire contents, and what
is false belief, unshakable belief, and non-evidential belief? Some, in their
innocence perhaps, have even asked what is wrong with unshakeable beliefs,
especially and obviously, for example, with regard to analytic truths such as 2
+2=4.
Aside from the disagreement about means, intentions, content, and
outcomes, other matters remain:
1.

2.
3.

Distinguishing and delimiting such key concepts germane to the
indoctrination discussion as neutral, fairminded, impartial, empathetic,
committed, dispassionate, and just;
Establishing the semantic range and possibly the logical status of doctrines;
and
Establishing whether religion has been defined too narrowly, and whether
worldviews might not lead to clearer reflection on indoctrination.6

By no means, do these questions exhaust the avenues of approach we might
take to such a complex area of enquiry. To the point of this chapter, the debate
on indoctrination has thus far largely failed to identify the following:
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Cases where a community or society widely accepts a dominant worldview
and then hegemonically enforces that view through the school system. This
situation is illustrated for us if we believe, for example, the allegations
typically made on the one side by critical theorists (who believe schools
have been hijacked by free-market conservatives), and, on the other side,
by conservative observers (who believe schools have been hijacked by
leftists and liberals); and
Cases where the curriculum contents fail to treat a matter sufficiently and
thus portray, by silence, an inaccurate picture, regardless of the intentions
(or means) of this lopsided portrayal. For example, Aboriginal Canadians
are usually invisible in histories of Canadian engagement in World War II.
The role of religion often goes missing in Canadian curricula. Until recent
years, women and "ordinary life" were largely absent from most history
books. I will return shortly-in my discussion of pluralism-to these
sometimes overlapping, unidentified, possible cases of indoctrination.

Several participants in the indoctrination debate have noted how frequently
one person positively labels a process education which someone else insists
counts as indoctrination. 7 Noting this tendency certainly does not gut the latter
term of its meaning for other purposes, but it should give anyone pause before
levelling the criticism that someone else is indoctrinating. That the pejorative
sense of indoctrination has now largely supplanted the descriptive, instructional
sense of the term (dating from before World War II) may or may not be related
to education's being largely a positive term, whose differentiated sense implies
worthwhile learning done in acceptable ways. 8 Whatever the range of possible
relationships between the two concepts, indoctrination and education, they
become diametric terms only when one selects the negative meaning of the one
and the positive sense of the other.
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Plurality and Pluralism
To begin this section, I will differentiate pluralism and plurality. In common
Canadian usage, pluralism tends to do two jobs which we should not only
distinguish, but which we ought to assign to two separate words if we hope to
maintain precision through our discussions, and eventually move those
discussions forward. First, pluralism usually designates a plural situation, to
which I would rather assign the term plurality. In this situation of plurality, we
find more-than-oneness, the "coexistence within one political jurisdiction of
people with publicly important different beliefs and ways of life," people with
"incommensurate ideological" differences, who "indwell irreducibly different
worlds." 9 The term commonly used for both meanings, pluralism, also implies
the absolutization or advocacy of the plural situation. That is: as an "ism" it
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implies that the many-ness designated by the rarely used term plurality (and by
the frequently used term pluralism) is worthwhile and that public policy should
be directed toward its realization. Confusion attends the use of pluralism
because it usually does this double duty, describing a plural state of affairs and
prescribing partiality to that state of affairs. I want to restrict pluralism to the
second, prescriptive meaning listed because, while I take it as given that Canada
faces cultural, linguistic, and religious plurality, it is not so clear how many
Canadians actually value genuine pluralism, or which kinds of plurality they
wish to embrace. 10
Thus, although I noted the typical implications of "ism" words a moment
ago, my desire to restrict pluralism does not rest on morphological grounds.
Still, in differentiating these two senses of pluralism, and assigning one to the
separate term plurality, I think I am making morphological sense.
In graphing the range of possible responses to plurality, we may see more
easily the importance of distinguishing these two common meanings of
pluralism, and thus the value of assigning one of the meanings its own more
descriptive word, plurality. Faced with linguistic, religious, or ethnic plurality,
a society, its institutions, and individuals might respond in any of several ways:
celebration

tolerance
respect

eradication
assimilation

Obviously, other words could be used instead of these five, and other
intermediate points on the continuum could be identified. My suggestion here
is that ordinary usage has varied from what one might expect. Words ending
in "ism" usually connote a position of advocacy. Yet, recognizably, eradication
and assimilation can hardly be viewed as the advocacy of plurality. Even
tolerance leaves us in some doubt, despite its having become a kind oflinguistic
icon in multicultural, Canadian education. In light of the amount of fuzzy usage
in usual discussions in these areas, I recommend to all of us the distinctive
terms pluralism and plurality, and will use them as distinctive terms throughout
this chapter.

History of Canadian Plurality
One comment on the prehistory of Canadian plurality is warranted. Religious
wars made it clear to post-Reformation Europe and England that some common
basis for public peace was required. The 1689 Act of Toleration in England
was viewed by many as a legislative means to end publicly oppressive and
tyrannical expressions of religious intolerance. Perceptions have shifted over
three centuries so that by our own time, pluralism (in its undifferentiated sense)
has achieved the status of secular doctrine, almost of cultural myth. Canadian
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That we can get along only when we leave our deepest (religious)
commitments in the private sphere;
That the public square must be reserved only for those things which we all
hold in common (despite the now-so-typically Canadian use of public
money to celebrate some fundamental differences); and
That the public school must and can be neutral.

New conditions in both Canada and the rest of the world are beginning to
force all educators to consider again our understandings of both plurality and
indoctrination. A "crisis of nationalism" 11 begins to tear Europe apart almost
as soon as the Soviet empire dissolves. Religious violence threatens the
stability of many nations. And, to the substance of this section of this chapter,
people around the world ask why there is no space for their religious
convictions in publicly funded schools that, they charge, are not neutral but
rather thoroughly doctrinaire. In Canada, several changes now force us to
reappraise plurality (and indoctrination). Immigration has brought increasing
cultural, linguistic, and religious plurality to Canada. As it does elsewhere,
disagreement frequently erupts in Canada regarding what topics are too divisive
(language, religion, culture) or controversial (abortion, homosexuality, birth
control) for treatment in Canadian schools. 12 The Council of Ministers of
Education of Canada (CMEC) has recognized Canadian plurality and, in a 1992
memorandum of agreement, seemed to lean toward the acceptance/celebration
end of the continuum:
Canada is a highly diversified country in every respect. Linguistic, racial,
cultural and religious differences, within and among provinces and
territories, are a fundamental characteristic of its people. We view this
pluralism as a source of great richness for the country, and believe that its
strength lies in maintaining a profound respect for differences. 13
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Despite their undifferentiated use of pluralism, the ministers express a common
Canadian sentiment. Interestingly, they include religion on their list.
Multiculturalism, until now, has primarily been perceived as a cultural and
linguistic matter. 14 The Canadian education ministers thus offer a more
inclusive range of characteristics by including religion in their statement. With
or without religion, their list points toward the respect and celebration end of
the continuum that I sketched earlier. Whether Canada is pluralistic is another
matter. Many Canadians point to a gulf between prose such as that in the
CMEC agreement and the reality they witness in their own schools, where, they
insist, some important differences between Canadians are barely tolerated, let
alone accepted or celebrated.
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Two other factors add to the difficulty that schools and policy-makers
encounter in their work. First-a foreground factor-the public has
historically come to view schools as a natural channel to bring about social
change. This view has meant increasing, not decreasing, normativity in the
curriculum regarding such matters as the environment, AIDS, smoking, and
nutrition. Ironically, this increase in normativity comes at a time when, in the
hands of schools, religious allegiances have become mere preferences, and
individualism seems to have taken ethics by storm. The second is a background
factor: previously central groups, such as the church, which did indoctrinate or
try to assimilate and even eradicate difference, now find themselves
marginalized. Here, I choose the church as an example, and the words central
and marginalized specifically to echo R. I. Moore's 1990 book, The Formation
of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250.
Another example of this emigration from centre to margin relates to what is
now roughly called "Euro-centrism" in the curriculum, a view of the world now
frequently questioned by educators and others concerned with education.
What has changed to warrant my proposing that the advent of cultural and
religious plurality suggests that the unsettled indoctrination debate be examined
again? Little has changed within the debate itself. Rather, the social and
educational landscape in Canada, like that of Britain and the United States, has
undergone statistically small but politically significant alteration so that
Canadian schools now serve several constituencies in ways that the members
of those constituencies consider inadequate. Specifically, the epistemological
assumptions underlying Western thought and science are seen to be in conflict
with certain peoples' religious convictions and ways of life.

Muslims
The Canadian Muslim population remains small, but Muslims encounter great
difficulty in accepting the claim to objectivity which underlies Western
science. 15 I will quote representative sources to illustrate this difficulty:
In Islam and the civilization which it created there was a veritable
celebration of knowledge all ... related to the sacred extending in a hierarchy
from an "empirical" and rational mode of knowing to that highest form of
knowledge (al-macrifah or cirfan) which is the unitive knowledge of God
not by [people] as [individuals], but by the divine center of human
intelligence which, at the level of gnosis, becomes the subject as well as
object of knowledge. 16

Many in the West consider this isolation of object from subject one of the
prerequisites of knowing; knowing is viewed as an asymmetrical relation
between subject and object. In fact, those who celebrate what they see as the
superiority of Western science and philosophy, often point to this feature as that
which, perhaps more than any other, has served to move Western science ahead.

57

1ty

Indoctrination and Assimilation

:rs
as
ial
he
1d
he
1d
1d
or
es
al

But some cry "foul" regarding the claim that Wes tern thought and science are
neutral, objective and therefore superior. To these people, Western arrogance
flows out of Wes tern mis perception of the subject/object relationship that
informs the hegemonic Western view of knowledge.
Qadir puts the problem more starkly than does Nasr:
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[T]he Islamic theory of knowledge .. .is fundamentally different from the
Western theory. One major reason for the difference is that the former is
based upon the spiritual conception of[human beings] and the universe [they
inhabit], while the latter is secular and devoid of the sense of the Sacred. It
is precisely for this reason, according to Muslim thinkers, that the Western
theory of knowledge poses one of the greatest challenges to [hu]mankind.
Knowledge in the West has become problematic as it has lost its true
purpose. It is ill-conceived and wrongly interpreted. It has elevated doubt
and scepticism and in some cases agnosticism to the level of scientific
methodology and has thereby brought chaos to all realms of human
knowledge. However, it should be understood that the Western conception
of knowledge is not value-free as is sometimes supposed; it is very much
partial, being the product of the Western worldview. 17
Many in the West would object that Qadir' s complaints are ill-founded, that our
science is value-free, and that it yields up objective knowledge. Yet, if Qadir
is correct in delineating the differences between Islamic and Western views of
knowledge, he makes quite plain why some people believe that allegedly
neutral, publicly funded schools indoctrinate.
Now, some may object by arguing that Muslims have their epistemology
wrong. But for the question of indoctrination as I mean us to reconsider it here,
such an objection carries little weight. Two groups follow incompatible epistemologies, both claiming to be able to adjudge the other. In a sense, the
philosophical discussion must stand aside because we live in plural Canada.
Why? Because Muslims use the school system, and they are not interested in
being told they simply have understood epistemology wrongly. The point is
that from their point of view, Wes tern education appears fundamentally in
opposition to their at-bottom convictions about the world and their knowledge
of it. 18 Qadir continues his remarks this way:
[T]he sense of the Sacred which furnishes the ultimate ground for
knowledge has to accompany and to interpenetrate the educative process at
every stage. Allah not only stands at the beginning of knowledge, He also
stands at the end, and He also accompanies and infuses grace into the entire
process of learning. In this process the sense of the Sacred is nowhere lost
sight of. 19
I will quote just one more remark from Qadir to illustrate how deeply Muslims'
difficulty with Canadian education might run: "The distinction between divine
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and non-divine knowledge is spurious. Knowledge is knowledge ... no matter
what its contents are." 20
Given this epistemology, Muslims will not be satisfied to have a world
religions class added into the curriculum somewhere in grades ten to twelve.
Nor will recognition of the Islamic year satisfy them. Muslims would view
these moves and others like them as unsatisfactory carrots, as insults. Religion
is, in one sense, everything for them, and as the Islamic Institute at Cambridge
argues continually, they believe school curriculum should reflect this. In
Ontario, a few Muslim families have sent their children to Christian schools, a
phenomenon already widespread in England. The parents of the Muslim
children in these Christian schools reason that although Christianity may be an
inferior religion, Christian schools at least recognize the hand of God on all of
life. They prefer this combination to publicly funded education, which insists
that the public square cannot make space for genuine religious differences and
that, when religion does come to school, it must be reduced to a song-and-dance
routine.
The restoration of Christian religious education in British
(state-funded) common schools in 1988 was, in fact, heavily supported by
Muslims, who argued that religion belonged in schools. Furthermore, they
argued that because Christianity-even if only nominal Christianity-was the
majority religion in Britain, Christianity, rather than comparative religions,
should be taught in British schools. That some Muslims in Britain still send
their children to Christian schools illustrates the depth of their conviction that
religious faith underlies the whole of the educational endeavour.

Canadian Aboriginal Peoples
For those from parts of Canada with minute Muslim populations, traditional
Canadian Aboriginal epistemology may pose more of a challenge. 21 Like
Muslims, Canadian Aboriginals protest the Western approach to knowledge that
underlies and saturates Canadian school curricula. For them, an obvious point
of difference with the dominant approach lies in the view of the natural world,
of which they consider human life an integral, not a separate part. 22 Again,
Western science and philosophy assume that subject-separateness is a strength,
and even a necessary first step to the development of our science. Such a view
is antithetical to the panentheism of Aboriginal spirituality. This short extract
from the Thanksgiving Prayer of the Longhouse People catches some flavour
of the Aboriginal view of the interrelatedness of all things:
We have been given the duty
To live in harmony with one another
And with other living things.
We give thanks that this is true.
We give thanks to our Mother Earth.
All that makes us strong and alive, comes from you
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We are all like children as we walk upon you.
You nourish us and all living things.
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Defenders of Western thought might (accurately) protest that the panentheism
evident here would not move Western science ahead, or even that Canadian
Aboriginal children had best learn Western ways if they want to get ahead in
Canadian life. Economically, such assimilationist sentiments make sense. 23
But to express them is, in a sense, to be answering the wrong question, because
Aboriginal people are concerned about a worldview inimical to their own. They
argue that this worldview runs through the curriculum and that publicly funded
Canadian schools (even band-controlled ones) indoctrinate. Mentioning
Aboriginal history, or even worldviews, in a class here and there does not
address the underlying differences between Western epistemology and an
epistemology informed by traditional Aboriginal spirituality, nor does it address
the problems Canadian Aboriginals thereby typically encounter in Canadian
curricula.
A brief survey of Canadian curricula which give space to Aboriginal
epistemology is very brief indeed. At this time, Newfoundland recognizes it
only minimally. 24 In the Nova Scotia social studies curriculum, the Mi'kmaq
people are studied, though not in detail. 25 New Brunswick offers a grade eleven
and twelve native studies course, and two elementary schools offer Maliseet
heritage programs. 26 Prince Edward Island gives 25 percent of its grade seven
social studies curriculum to Aboriginal cultures. 27 In Manitoba, Aboriginal
epistemology and spirituality are included throughout kindergarten to grade
twelve social studies in the context of broader examination of Aboriginal
culture, recognizing "that in traditional societies spirituality informs the day to
day activities of the people, and that a knowledge of people's beliefs and values
is essential to understanding the society." 28 According to the 1989 Indian and
Metis education policy from kindergarten to grade twelve, the province of
Saskatchewan requires that Aboriginal content-that is, epistemology and
spirituality-be integrated into all curriculum areas. By the 1992-93 school
year, Aboriginal content was being classroom tested. To their credit, officials
in Saskatchewan education understood that Aboriginal spirituality was not
simply a compartment oflife: "When people see the term spirituality, they often
assume it is a form of religion. It is not. Rather, Indigenous spirituality is a
philosophy which attempts to understand human existence and relationships
with nature. It is a perspective of individual and community development,
human societies and the environment." 29 In Alberta, all students take
Aboriginal "histories, cultures, and lifestyles" in various social studies courses
"so they can benefit from the values and lifestyles of Native cultures." 30 The
Native Education Project produced a Native Content Analysis Information
guide in September 1989 to aid in detecting bias. While it raises several
concerns, it deals little with the integrality of Aboriginal worldviews. In British

60

Towards an Ethics of Community

Columbia, nothing specific is required, and even in band-controlled schools,
attention is varied, "depending on the convictions of the band." 31
As one might expect, the Yukon has Aboriginal worldviews thoroughly
integrated at many points (as required by the September 1990, Education Act),
including permitted absences from school for religious and cultural activities.
The Northwest Territories has two separate curricula specifically to address
questions of Aboriginal worldviews (Dene, Kede, and Inuit). Although Canadian schools now pay a degree of attention to Canadian Aboriginal history, or to
their views of environment, the epistemological foundations on which those
views rest remain largely absent from Canadian education; Manitoba,
Saskatchewan, and the territories being the main exceptions. 32
So far, I have argued that Canadian publicly funded education faces a
difficulty, somewhat of its own making. The indoctrination debate leaves few
parties happy about what transpires in schools. Those who would dominate that
debate now find themselves facing representatives of a plurality of worldviews,
some, such as Islam and Aboriginal spirituality, with epistemologies utterly
different from the Western rationalism that they charge shapes and controls
Canadian classrooms.
SUGGESTED WAYS FORWARD
What forms or models might we use to show genuine respect for these worldviews and others like them which are fundamentally incompatible with the
worldview apparently underlying most Canadian publicly funded education?
Given that minority worldviews will not be satisfactorily addressed by adding
a course to the school curriculum, or merely recognizing special days, foods,
and music, how can we honour and implement true pluralism? If we are going
to take these fundamental differences seriously, I suggest that we take a
four-pronged approach. This will involve considering epistemology, the assimilationist appearance and effects of some public policies, other possible ways to
structure plurality, and further exploration of some key concepts related to the
indoctrination and pluralism discussions.
Reexamining Epistemological Foundations
Because we must be more cautious than we have been in the past not simply to
dismiss minority worldviews with a wave of the hand, we would do well, first,
to reexamine the foundations of the dominant Western epistemological
paradigm. We must be more cautious than we have been in the past; we cannot
simply dismiss minority worldviews with a wave of the hand.
Marginalized groups who discover a gulf between their own epistemology
and that dominant in Canadian public schools gain momentum almost daily
from feminist studies in philosophy as well as from other quarters. For
example, Lorraine Code, philosopher at York University, notes that
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Implicit in the veneration of objectivity central to scientific practice is the
conviction that objects of knowledge are separate from knowers and
investigators ... that they remain separate and unchanged throughout
investigative, information-gathering, and knowledge construction
processes. 33
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However, she argues that "knowledge is, inextricably, subjective and objective"
and that "knowledge is inescapably, the product of an intermingling of
subjective and objective elements."34 Code does not go as far as many feminists
in subjectifying knowledge, but she does open enough space to give a Muslim
or a Canadian Aboriginal room to breathe. 35
Richard Rorty, albeit still a confessed rationalist and liberal, has begun to
speak of those finally untestable, at-bottom convictions by which we all live.
He calls these our "final vocabularies" and admits to their divisive function
within society, even suggesting that liberalism itself retains the power to
exclude. 36 Rorty is not far from Anthony Flew on at least this matter: Flew
describes at one point the "ultimacy of science" and even calls for openness "to
the possibility of new, and possibly upsetting discoveries of what actually is the
case." 37 Ronald Laura calls Rorty' s "final vocabularies" the "epistemologically
primitive" starting points of science, and he speaks of "frameworks" within
which scientific and philosophical questions and answers make sense. 38 I do not
know whether Muslims and Aboriginal Canadians consider people like Code
and Rorty their allies. Nor do I know how many are aware that Reformed folk
have been offering such criticisms of epistemology for decades. However, I do
know that they are asking some of the same questions of Western science: Why
did one way of viewing things gain its "epistemic privilege?" and "Is this
epistemic privilege justified?" 39 In this current debate, these foundational,
worldview questions are not only among the most formidable, but they are
among the most important.

Rethinking Current Policies: Appearance and Effect
Besides asking rationalism to make space in the epistemological discussion for
other approaches, we must review the appearance and effect of current
educational policies toward minorities, especially those whose religious
sensibilities are offended by what appears to them an assimilationist approach.
Minority groups are now charging that indoctrination in an alien way of
thinking takes place in ostensibly public schools. Members of these groups
perceive an essentially religious character in publicly funded Canadian schools
and they feel like they have encountered the teeth of a policy of eradication and
assimilation. These encounters, ironically, occur surrounded by the language of
pluralism, neutrality, and toleration-even celebration-of difference.
The defendants in the Mozert court case in the United States argued
successfully through two courts that public schools essentially serve
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assimilationist ends, in conflict with the Christian religion. 40 While such a case
has no legal bearing on Canadian education, it may have moral suasion
inasmuch as this same kind of "subtle coercion" -read: indoctrination-may
also characterize Canadian education. 41
Pressure to reconsider whether publicly funded school classrooms are as
neutral as their defenders claim comes from many quarters, not only from
cultural and religious minorities or legal scholars. Some educational theorists
as well are saying as much. For over two decades sociologists of education
have argued that school classrooms further a conservative agenda.
Simultaneously, voices on the right charge that classrooms promote a liberal
agenda.

Reconsidering Alternative Structures for Plurality
Thus far, I have suggested that we not only scrutinize the epistemological
discussion, but that we reexamine educational policies related to worldviews,
to religion and to religious education. Third, I suggest that we seek ways to
structure plurality other than the effectively assimilationist approach that, some
people charge, presently characterizes Canadian education (even while most
defenders of Canadian public education deny having assimilationist intentions).
Canadians may want to attempt some kind of structural pluralism (and I mean
pluralism in my own restricted sense here, where plurality is advocated). The
Dutch, for example, have organized their public life in this way for most of this
century. 42 Whether in broadcasting, education, or labour unions, Dutch
communities based on various political ideologies and religious viewpoints
have enjoyed public space (and in the case of education-public money) to
pursue their goods with others of like mind.
Given how differently Dutch society is organized from our own, Canadian
provinces should perhaps consider the model implemented in Quebec as a
partial solution to the dissatisfaction of religious minorities. Quebec school
boards are required to offer students as many as three choices as demand
warrants: Roman Catholic religious education, Protestant religious education,
or moral education. The first two are made available as opt-in courses, the last
is required of those not desiring either of the explicitly religious options. If it
wished, Quebec could extend the list to include, for example, Islamic religious
education in those districts where population justified such a move. If other
Canadian provinces adopted Quebec's approach, Canadians could provide legal
room for minorities (and majorities) to give attention to, and expression of, their
at-bottom religious commitments within some single publicly funded system.
On this account, religious differences would not be ethnicized as they often are
now-reduced to a song-and-dance routine for celebration days-but would be
treated seriously in curriculum by people whose commitment was considered
an asset rather than a liability. In making this suggestion, I assume that all
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religious groups with the inclination and resources to do so should be given
public space and money to describe their outlook on the world.
From the point of view of some religious folk, of course, this option still
suffers from one telling limitation: religion is still cordoned off in a single
course, perhaps while secular materialism continues to saturate the remainder
of the curriculum and the school ethos. Still, allowing representatives to make
such courses available seems like the least that school boards should do if they
indeed want to take worldview differences seriously.
These are only two means by which to express genuine pluralism within
education, and even they come up wanting in obvious ways. There may be
more, and I suggest that we must think creatively to articulate what they might
be. All the creative thinking on earth, however, will be of no use, unless those
who claim to be the guardians of the public square admit that all education will
be informed by one set of convictions or another, and that a society concerned
with fairness will see to it that parents' convictions inform their own children's
education. 43
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Reopening Key Concepts
My last suggestion involves some of our key concepts. Even a cursory look at
the matters I have raised here shows that we must reexamine some of the key
ideas in the indoctrination and pluralism discussions.
I begin with public education. Canadians interested in education, especially
philosophers of education, may need to begin asking a highly modified gloss on
W. D. Hudson's question of twenty years ago, "Is Religious Education
Possible?"; namely, "Is public education possible?"44 Throughout this chapter,
I have used the phrase "publicly funded" to refer to the schools most people call
public schools. Without a doubt, almost all Canadians pay for these schools,
and in that sense, they are public. But public, by definition, has to do with that
which we do or have in common, whether meetings and parades, or transit
systems and arenas. We want to recognize that the meaning of public has
changed historically, and will continue to do so, but I insist that the time has
come again to make the concept problematic, as did John S. Mill in On Liberty
and John Dewey in The Public and Its Problems. 45 This is necessary because
increasing numbers of Canadians are now saying they do not recognize the
publicly funded school systems of this country as theirs; that is, they do not
share the worldview underlying these school systems. For many, public schools
implies neutral schools, and neutral schools do not exist. 46 In what direction
must we go, or should attempt to go to make room for those groups claiming
that publicly funded Canadian schools are failing either to make space for their
own, openly religious, at-bottom ontological and epistemological convictions,
or to recognize and admit the ontological and epistemological assumptions
lying at the bottom of public education itself?
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Refusal to reopen this question of how truly "public" Canadian publicly
funded education actually is may indicate that defenders of publicly funded
education have something to hide, albeit unconsciously. Such a refusal will
serve only to increase the suspicions of those who already believe a monopoly
exists and is primarily interested in protecting itself. Such a refusal may also
demonstrate a shallowness of actual sentiment behind the rhetoric of pluralism
so characteristic of Canadian educational discourse.
Included in this call to problematize the term "public" is the
reconsideration of our definitions of "religion" as we use it with reference to
education. 47 Ninian Smart has suggested that religious education courses (in the
United Kingdom) consider a wide variety of ideologies when such courses treat
world religions. Thus Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Islam, Buddhism and
Christianity would be joined by humanism, secularism, communism and
whatever other "final vocabularies" or symbolic systems people ultimately
employ to organize their cognitive framework. In addition to this change, Smart
suggests we use the word worldviews (as I have largely done here) instead of
religions. 48 Smart's suggestion would accord well with one line of opinion
regarding US legal debates on separation of church and state, establishment, and
free exercise. That line of opinion is that "any set of beliefs concerning a
desirable way of life" functions as a religion and should be counted as such. 49
Recognizably, Smart's suggestion leads us miles away from any of the received
definitions within philosophy of education, but it does lead us toward the
creation of space for all Canadians to express their deepest convictions within
the schools they are compelled to fund. 50
Educational theorists also need to clarify several terms that arise in
discussions of indoctrination. I include here especially neutrality and
impartiality, the former because it has figured so centrally in American
religion-in-education jurisprudence for over forty years and is now creeping into
Canadian educational discourse, and the latter because I view it as the needed
disposition among those persons committed to some worldview or other who
inevitably will teach religion in Canadian public school classrooms. Those who
call for neutrality in education seem to have confused something ideological or
confessional, which does not exist, with something procedural and pedagogical.
These people seek the former-ideologically neutral teachers-when they
should be seeking the latter-those teachers capable of impartiality or some
kind of procedural neutrality. That this search may necessarily be fruitless is
discussed thoroughly in legal and educational literature. 51 Perhaps what drives
such a search is a confusion of neutrality in public space, and secularism, which
often comes cloaked as neutrality. 52
John Valauri, in his survey of how neutrality has functioned in American
establishment clause jurisprudence, notes three features of neutrality that I want
to repeat here. 53 First, he notes that neutrality is a complex concept, implying
both non-involvement and impartiality. For Valauri, non-involvement does not
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mean disinterestedness or isolation, rather it implies intentionally refraining
from intervention which would reveal favouritism for one of the parties.
Witness the referee in sports, who we expect to be intensely involved, yet
remains impartial, by which Valauri means that one should examine and
regulate one's actions to avoid giving advantage to any side.
Valauri also notes that neutrality is a formal concept, by which he means
that "neutral" asserts a relationship between specified things or people. We
would need specific information about each case to determine what one is
neutral toward. Thus, we are never able to claim that we are absolutely neutral
or neutral toward everything (unless "we" is ontologically challenged perhaps).
Third, Valauri notes that neutrality is an ambiguous term, having different
meanings in different contexts, especially as it has been interpreted in the US
Supreme Court, and in prescriptions for educational practice. This ambiguity
may be partly related to the fact that the concept of neutrality is subject to
conception building. By that I mean that a dictionary will report several
meanings for neutral or neutrality, but as is the case with many central concepts
in educational or social policy discussions, in actual use people begin to shape
the concept according to their definitions of the good life and their visions for
society. 54 I am not saying there is anything wrong when such conception-building occurs, in fact it is in some ways the lifeblood of policy-making
in a democratic society, I just want us to be conscious of what we are about
when we do it. That people will argue for their conceptions of neutrality in this
way should catch none of us off guard. But, back to Valauri's point about the
ambiguity of neutrality. Given that the concept has become so important within
educational policy discussion and is thus subject to conception-building, should
we not expect such ambiguity? 55
We now ask the historical question about neutrality. Historically, have
people thought schools or teachers should be neutral? The answer of course is,
"for the most part, no," although we recognize that philosophers have struggled
for centuries with questions of authority and neutrality in education. In fact,
almost until the present century, the stated purpose of schools and the effect
desired by both parents and teachers has always been to inculcate in the young
specific knowledge, skills and, to our point here, values (and sometimes even
"wisdom"!). And this pertains to duty, loyalty to king, and honour, democratic
citizenship, good character, and the love of God, or any of several dozen other
values or sets of values (depending on what century and state one examines).
Neither was there any doubt historically whether school knowledge should be
presented in such a way that the values in view were promoted.
Having reviewed educational history in one paragraph and concluded that
neutrality has for the most part not been considered desirable, we should now
ask if it has ever before this century been thought possible? Again, we boldly
answer, "no." However, we must remember that because it was not considered
a viable notion, it was not analyzed as such. The first religion-in-education
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cases began to reach US courts only in the 1880s. Now, ironically enough, a
century later, many people outside the courts and the academy are becoming
interested in the role of religion, and ideology in education. In fact groups from
both ends of the political spectrum now say, for a variety of reasons, that
schools are not neutral. Libertarians, children's rights advocates, some freeschoolers, and some home-schoolers raise complaints, especially about the
effects on children of compulsory schooling and of the curriculum in place.
Critical theorists and feminists observe that schools treat knowledge as if it
were actually structured the way schools structure it, instead of recognizing its
contingent character. In other words, all knowledge is constructed by certain
people or classes of people at certain times, with certain class or gender
interests in view. They argue that the received view of knowledge, in fact,
perpetuates these class and gender inequalities. In short, the curriculum itself
is not neutral; rather it represents a selection from among many possible
contents.
This absence of neutrality in schools also concerns members of many
acknowledged religions, who can cite a litany of complaints. They point to the
relativisation of religious belief, indoctrination by silence about the role of
religion in life, open hostility to religious belief, perceived opposition between
the school curriculum and their own religiously informed views of geological
origins, species development, authority, women, war, morality, sexual
orientation, contraception, sex before marriage, self-authentication, the basis of
self-esteem, and human perfectibility, to name only the main flashpoints.
Representatives of business interests complain that students are poorly
prepared for participation in the marketplace. The missing skills themselves are
not an issue of neutrality, but the dispositions toward work with which students
graduate, and the failure of schools to instill skills may indeed find their roots
in the same intellectual ethos. 56
Finally, Christians in the Reformational tradition, Canadian Aboriginals,
Sikhs, Muslims and many others believe that all of life is rooted in underlying,
religious convictions, that it is lived in adherence to one worldview or another.
Such persons also struggle with what they see as the non-neutrality of
classrooms.
Within earshot of this chorus of voices, I find problematic the
commonplace Canadian notion that schoolteachers should or could be neutral
in matters of religion, or that such neutrality should or could be manifested by
ignoring religion. Examining three non-educational situations where neutrality
is used will make that problem clearer.
In a most straightforward use, we speak of a car transmission being in
neutral, that is, not in gear. With the transmission in this state, the car may
stand still, roll forward, or roll backward, but, by definition, cannot do so either
aided or hindered by the car's engine. If the car transmission is an example of
neutrality, then those who expect teachers to demonstrate neutrality regarding
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religion and other controversial issues must either be looking for some other
kind of neutrality, or be setting themselves up for disappointment; teachers in
classrooms are simply not capable of this kind of neutrality because the
"engine" of one's mind is always in gear. I contend that demanding or seeking
such neutrality gets us nowhere.
Moreover, we remember that during the Second World War, Switzerland
adopted a policy of neutrality, which does not mean it had no concerns, wishes,
or preferences. Rather, it did not actively side with either the Axis or Allies. 57
The car example digests much more easily than does the Swiss example,
perhaps for this very reason. In the sphere of action, Switzerland's neutrality
may be akin to that of the car transmission. But we recognize that what the
Swiss felt and what they did are two separate matters. In doing so, we gain
another glimpse why classroom neutrality is so difficult to achieve.
Furthermore, if we consider the referee in sports for a moment, we realize
that any attempt the referee might make to act neutrally toward the two teams
is bound to fail. A tight game, for example, a game played close to the rules,
will inevitably favour one team over another. Allowing the game to open
up-interpreting and enforcing the rules loosely-will favour the other team.
So what is a referee to do? Those concerned for justice might call for just that,
officiating executed in such a way that justice is done, though this stance
obviously leaves great latitude and responsibility with the official as to what
that means and how it is to be dispensed. This stance also implies nonneutrality-likely in more than one direction-at various points during the
game. Recognizing the difficulties with neutrality in these circumstances leads
us closer to the problem with classrooms. In sports officiating, we most likely
define the neutrality we seek in terms of impartiality toward the two teams.
Indeed, those who are calling for neutrality in the classroom are seeking this
kind of neutrality. 58
Obviously, in confessional schools, no one wants neutral teachers. 59 But
for publicly funded schools, and multi-faith schools, the question remains: Is
there any way to move forward in our thinking about classroom neutrality and
to respond to the rather naive call for neutral teachers? I suggest that classroom
neutrality on controversial issues such as religion is more akin to neutrality in
sports officiating than it is to that which car transmissions achieve regularly.
It is likely only the Martian teacher who is truly neutral on matters of
controversy such as politics and religion. Faced with the current shortage of
Martian teachers, we need to ask who can best handle education about religion
in classrooms. Logically, we are faced with few choices when we look for
teachers:
1.

Experts who are usually either:
a. insiders to religion and thus, by definition, persons who believe one
religion to be true60 or superior, or
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b.

2.

outsiders to religion who believe that religion is merely an
anthropological phenomenon and not true.
Non-experts, with varying degrees of religious commitment, who fit
roughly the two categories of expertise listed just above.

Obviously, we could fit our four classes onto a matrix, a presentation that
would miss much of the nuancing necessary to discuss accurately the kinds and
shades of belief we are attempting to discuss here. More accurately, we could
perhaps talk about degrees of commitment and degrees of expertise by means
of intersecting vertical and horizontal continua. Assuming that we expect
teachers to be relative experts in the fields they teach (and thus have barred
members of the second group I mentioned-non-experts-from teaching about
religion), we can ask this question: Which kind of person is best qualified to
teach about religion in a Canadian classroom?
In its recommendations, the 1994 Ontario document Guidelines for Education about Religion makes clear that religious believers are disqualified in
principle because they are likely to indoctrinate. 61 In one stroke, these
guidelines (which are typical) eliminate one of the two groups of experts from
which one might pick teachers for courses dealing with religion. Such a
recommendation rests on a misunderstanding of neutrality (one suspects among
other things). Ontario Ministry of Education seems to work under the
impression that ideologically/confessionally neutral teachers are out there
somewhere, though they are obviously not adherents to acknowledged religions.
I respond that not one of us is ideologically and confessionally neutral, that all
persons carry within themselves and live by fundamental convictions about
religion-I would even call them religious convictions-of one kind or
another. If we all in fact do live by such at-bottom convictions, then we must
ask what will be the "angle" or "cant" on acknowledged religion in Ontario
publicly funded classrooms? If the teachers in those classrooms meet Ontario's
preferences and are therefore not adherents to any acknowledged religious faith,
we can expect that angle to be one of comparative religion, with its built-in
antipathy for religious conviction. Once again, followers of acknowledged
religions are given cause for complaint.
We could go at this problem of teaching about religion in publicly funded
schools another way. Some people are dispositionally capable of impartially
handling controversial matters in a classroom. It is these teachers, who have
demonstrated that they are disposed toward and capable of such impartiality that
ought to teach about religion in publicly funded classrooms. In other words, the
grounds for selecting appropriate teachers are dispositional and not ideological.
These grounds are related almost to skill. 62 Unfortunately, mention of the
disposition toward impartiality (or the ability to teach with impartiality) is
absent from Ontario's guidelines (as is usually the case in such documents and
discussions of teaching religion or about religion). Instead, several university
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religious studies programs are recommended to prospective teachers of religion.
Apparently, the twin assumptions (of Ontario's Ministry of Education) are that
such programs provide the knowledge and dispositions necessary for proper
instruction (or perhaps that dispositions are not an issue when one has studied
comparative religion), and that what we might call "insider" education (at the
Buddhist Study Centre, The Institute for Christian Studies, or The Islamic
Society of North America, for example) is ill preparation for teaching in
publicly funded schools.
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CONCLUSION
When we proceed with commitment, we must recognize that the tolerance
required in the public square should not imply indifference to real differences
in the classroom. 63 Rather, teachers and students should be able to be clear
about and, within certain limits, live according to their differences, even argue
about those differences, albeit with civility. 64 In selecting teachers for religious
education or for education about religion, we must recognize that all people
possess faith commitments about religion (which I earlier called religious
commitments). 65 As Niblett said more than three decades ago, "The teacher of
religious knowledge who does not understand what religion is really about can
no more teach the subject than a teacher of art little moved by beauty can in any
real sense of the term teach art." 66
If academics refuse to budge on their claim to privileged epistemic access,
and refuse to make such terms as public, neutrality, and religion problematic,
then those groups who sense their active and continued marginalization will
grow increasingly impatient with the process, and with publicly funded
education. Parties on all sides must show willingness to engage in dialogue.
Neuhaus dismisses as impossible the notion of a naked public square, and asks
instead for a hospitable public square in which all are welcomed to participate. 67
Recognizing that Canada is characterized by plurality, recognizing that
annihilation and assimilation are unjust (and unworkable anyway), and
recognizing that talking tolerance grants too little in some cases and too much
in others, we must begin making space in Canadian schools or at least with
Canadian educational dollars for the genuine expression of genuine differences.
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embedded in the curriculum would remain. Even that embeddedness divides into two
levels. The curriculum could be said to teach or to teach about one or more epistemologies, but the curriculum also found its own shape and structure within an epistemology.
So we see that pedagogical neutrality, even if it were possible, would function simply as
a veneer over other, deeper, commitments. The author thanks Robert Sweetman for
pointing this out in an earlier draft.
I still want to argue that impartial teachers would serve the educative purposes of the
school, while recognizing that some parents connected to confessional schools want
indoctrination, not impartiality.
In this context, I use true intentionally and consciously.
Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1992. Restrictive as they are, these guidelines are more open
than Memorandum #112 (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1991) which they are meant to
replace. Memorandum 112 largely proscribed treatment of religion in any way at most
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times (in response to the Elgin County Decision of January 1990 which ended Religious
Education in Ontario publicly funded schools). As Brian Hill points out (Hill, p. 51), to
"teach certain subjects and not others declares our value judgements about the worthwhile
life and the educated person" and to exclude religion is to "disvalue" it.
Further examination is required of the assumption that meeting ideological criteria
guarantees that religion will be neither aided nor inhibited in publicly funded classrooms.
J. P. Powell, "Philosophical Models of Teaching," Harvard Educational Review 35
(1965): 494-96.
G. Weigel, "Achieving Disagreement: From Indifference to Pluralism," Journal of Law
and Religion 8 (1990): 175.
These commitments precede and underlie any and all philosophies of education.
W.R. Niblett, ed., Christian Education in a Secular Society (London: Oxford University
Press, 1960), pp. 78-79.
Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984).
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